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A recent South African judgment concerning the application of the most favoured nation 
clause in the South Africa/ Netherlands double tax convention has once again raised questions 
regarding the correct approach to the interpretation of treaties in South Africa and what 
information should be admissible as part of this process. In particular the court’s strict 
approach to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of double tax treaties 
and the application of the parol evidence rule requires further investigation.  
This dissertation considers this question by first analysing the approach to interpretation and 
the admission of extrinsic evidence as provided for under the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. Thereafter, the South African domestic approach to interpretation and the 
principles regulating the admission of extrinsic evidence is considered. A particular focus is 
placed on the parol evidence rule as applied by South African courts.  
Following this analysis, the dissertation proceeds with a comparison of the two approaches 
in order to determine any commonalities and differences that might exist. Through this 
process of comparison, the dissertation finds that the contemporary South African approach 
to interpretation, is largely aligned with the approach in the Vienna convention, subject to 
certain limitations on evidence admissibility as provided for under the domestic parol 
evidence rule. 
The dissertation concludes that it would be appropriate for a South African court to apply the 
ordinary domestic principles of interpretation when interpreting tax treaties, provided that 
this process must still be informed by the principles of the Vienna Convention, other sources 
of customary international law and foreign case law on the interpretation of treaties. The 
interpretive process would nevertheless remain subject to the domestic principles of 
evidence admissibility and the parol evidence rule.         
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1.1.1  The Dispute 
 
The recent judgment of ABC Proprietary Limited v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services1 has once again raised the often-contentious question of what the correct 
approach to the interpretation of double tax conventions (DTC) should be in South Africa.  
 
The taxpayer, a South African tax resident company, was the wholly owned subsidiary of a 
Dutch company. It declared dividends to the parent during 2012 and withheld and paid 
dividends withholding tax (DWT) on these distributions at the reduced rate of 5% as provided 
for under article 10(2)(a) of the South Africa Netherlands DTC (the SA/Netherlands DTC)2. In 
2013, upon making a further distribution, the taxpayer and its parent reconsidered the issue 
and instead applied a rate of 0% on the basis that article 10(10) of the SA/Netherlands DTC 
would allow for a complete exemption. A refund was also claimed in relation to the DWT that 
was previously paid over. SARS rejected the claim, arguing that a 5% withholding tax is 
payable on the distributions.  
 
In summary article 10(2)(a) of the SA/Netherlands DTC provides for a reduced DWT rate 
where the beneficial owner is a company holding more than 10% of the capital in the company 
declaring the dividend.3  However, this is qualified by article 10(10) which provides that in the 
event that South Africa concludes another DTC with a third country after the date of 
conclusion of the SA/Netherlands DTC that provides for a lower rate than the 5% 
contemplated above, this lower rate will also apply under the SA/Netherlands DTC. This is 
commonly referred to as the ‘most-favoured nation” (MFN) clause. 
 
 
1 ABC Proprietary Limited v The Commissioner of the South African Revenue Services (2019) JOL 46057 (TC).    
2 Convention between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (23 
January 2009), Treaties, IBFD; as amended by the Protocol dated 23 January 2009. 
3 Article 10(2). 
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Subsequent to the conclusion of the SA/Netherlands DTC, South Africa concluded a new DTC 
with Sweden (the SA/Sweden DTC) which like the SA/Netherlands DTC provided for a 5% DWT 
coupled with a MFN clause.4 However, unlike the SA/Netherlands DTC, the MFN clause 
contained in the SA/Sweden DTC did not limit its application to only DTCs concluded after the 
conclusion of the SA/Sweden DTC. The Sweden MFN clause could also be invoked where 
South Africa had a pre-existing DTC that provided for a lower rate than 5%.5  
 
The taxpayer argued that the Sweden MFN clause was triggered immediately upon conclusion 
of the SA/Sweden DTC, as South Africa provided more favourable DWT rates under a pre-
existing DTC, i.e. the South Africa Kuwait DTC (the SA/Kuwait DTC) which gave exclusive taxing 
rights to the recipient state.6 As a result, no DWT would be imposed under the SA/Sweden 
DTC. Based on this, the taxpayer argued that the MFN clause of the SA/Netherlands DTC was 
also triggered, as a subsequent treaty (I.e. the SA/Sweden DTC) provided for a more 
favourable rate than the 5% provided under the SA/Netherlands DTC. 
 
SARS argued that the SA/Netherlands DTC should be interpreted restrictively taking account 
of the intention of the contracting states and that the MFN clause should only be triggered 
where preferential treatment was afforded directly to another country in terms of a 
subsequent DTC and not indirectly through a pre-existing DTC as was the current case.7 It 
further contended that where the words of a treaty do not mirror the intention of the 
contracting states, the words should be ignored, augmented or supplemented to give effect 
to the contracting parties’ true intention.8 In this regard the judgment records that evidence 
was led by the Respondent as to the intention of South Africa in concluding the tax treaties 
and that the Netherlands shared this intention.9      
 
4 Convention between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Sweden for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (22 December 1995), Treaties, 
IBFD; as amended by the Protocol dated 23 April 2012. 
5 Article 10(6). 
6 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the State of 
Kuwait for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income (20 April 2007), Treaties, IBFD. 
7 ABC Proprietary Limited supra note 1 para 16. 




On the facts of ABC Proprietary Limited, the court considers SARS’ argument as essentially 
requiring the reading-in of words into the Sweden MFN clause to limit its application to only 
future DTCs that provide more favourable rates.10 
The taxpayer in turn argued that the terms of the SA/Netherlands DTC are clear and 
unambiguous and that there is no scope for reading additional terms into the treaty to give 
effect to the alleged intention of the contracting states.11  
1.1.2  The Court’s Approach to Interpretation 
 
In evaluating these arguments, the Court states that although a treaty has statutory authority 
in accordance with section 108 of the ITA, they are nevertheless the product of agreement 
and not the result of a legislative decision making.12 They should therefore be interpreted in 
accordance with the principles relating to the interpretation of written agreements and 
specifically those concluded in the realm of international law.13 The court concludes that the 
starting point is therefore South African domestic law and “if appropriate” private 
international law (sic) of which the primary source is the Vienna convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT).14  
The court refers to the two ends of a ‘continuum’ or ‘spectrum’ that a court is confronted 
with in interpretational disputes.15 Firstly in relation to the terms of the written agreement 
itself, the words can range from entirely clear and unambiguous to vague, ambiguous and 
uncertain (the continuum of accuracy). Secondly the interpretational method applied by our 
courts range from a strict application of the actual words (literalism) to an approach that 
favours the intention of the parties, with the words of the agreement merely serving as a 
guide (intentionalism) (the continuum of approach). The court states that there is no absolute 
answer on which approach should be applied by our courts and that this would be determined 
on the facts of each case. 
 
10 Ibid para 18. 
11 Ibid para 21. 
12 Ibid para 19. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.    
15 Ibid para 20. 
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On the facts of ABC Proprietary Limited, both parties were ad idem that the words of the 
agreement were clear and unambiguous, but they argued for different approaches to be 
followed in the interpretation of the treaty. SARS essentially argued for a “reading-in” of 
words to align the treaty with the alleged intention of the contracting parties. The taxpayer 
on the other hand argued for a literal interpretation of the unambiguous words used.  
In evaluating the contrasting approaches advocated for, the court analyses several cases from 
the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) dealing with the domestic approach to interpretation and 
in particular the admissibility of extrinsic evidence as part of the interpretation process.16 
Based on this analysis the court concludes that the principles regarding the admissibility of 
extrinsic evidence as articulated in the case of KPMG remains part of our law and has not 
been detracted from by the subsequent SCA cases on interpretation.17  
The court concludes (having regard to the principles from KPMG) that it would therefore not 
be allowed to consider extrinsic evidence regarding the intention of the contracting parties 
where the provisions of the applicable treaties were clear and unambiguous.18 
Further the court states that it has considered domestic law in reaching its conclusion, and 
that based on the merits of the decision, no purpose would be served by referring any further 
to international law or prior foreign judgments or the principle of comity.19  
1.2  Research question 
 
The judgment of ABC Proprietary Limited raises important questions regarding the correct 
approach to interpretation and what evidence can be led and used in the interpretation of a 
DTC. Does the domestic parol evidence rule as articulated in KPMG apply without more or is 
there justification for a more liberal admission of evidence in the interpretation of DTCs by 
South African courts?   
 
16 Cases considered includes Johnson v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A); Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 
(3) SA 761 (A); KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd & another 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA); Natal Joint 
Muncipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA); Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v 
S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA) and The City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blair Atholl Homeowners Association (2019) 1 All SA 291 (SCA).    
17 ABC Proprietary Limited supra note 1 para 30. 
18 Ibid. 




ABC Proprietary Limited indicates that the starting point for the interpretation of international 
treaties is domestic law and ‘if appropriate’ private international law of which the primary 
source is the VCLT. The court stating that: 
“…the principles applicable to the interpretation of international tax treaties in South 
African law and International Law are the same as those applied by our courts in 
construing statutes and agreements. This is also in accordance with the principles 
enunciated in Krok and Another v CSARS 2015 (6) SA 317 (SCA) in particular paragraph 
[27].”20 
However, paragraph 27 of the Krok judgment provides that – 
“Regarding the approach to be adopted in construing the relevant provisions, 
consideration must be had to the rules applicable to the interpretation of treaties 
which are binding on South Africa and all states as rules of customary international 
law. These rules, which are essentially no different from those generally applied by our 
courts in construing statutes and agreements, are set out in arts 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (Vienna, 23 May 1969; TS 58 (1980); 
Cmnd 7964) which read…”21 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added) 
The statement in Krok that the rules applicable to the interpretation of treaties are essentially 
no different from those applied domestically by our courts was substantiated with a footnote 
that referred to paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund judgment. It 
is therefore the approach to interpretation as articulated by Wallis JA in Endumeni which the 
court in Krok contended was no different from the approach contained in articles 31 and 32 
of the VCLT.22 
The Krok judgment also makes it clear that a court must have regard to the customary 
international law as contained in articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT and that this is not merely 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 Krok and another v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services 2015 (6) SA 317 (SCA).  
22 Ibid para 27. 
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something to consider where appropriate as contemplated in ABC Proprietary Limited.23 As 
stated by Hattingh in his commentary on the Krok judgement in the ITLR:  
“The affirmation of arts 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention as a binding norm is a 
welcome development, particularly since it now provides a clear injunction to lower 
courts on how to approach treaty interpretation...”24 
Unfortunately, despite some brief references to the VCLT, the court in ABC Proprietary Limited 
fails to engage in detail with the interpretation guidelines as set out in the VCLT, nor does it 
consider previous South African judgments in which DTCs were interpreted to consider 
whether this provides any basis for a divergence from our ordinary domestic interpretation 
rules and the application of the parol evidence rule. The court also does not provide clear 
reasons for its cursory dismissal of foreign judgments as an interpretative aid. 
 
In view of these questions, the author therefore seeks to evaluate the court’s strict approach 
to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of double tax treaties. The 
author proposes to conduct research on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence having regard 
to the VCLT, international case law and commentary on the application of the VCLT. 
Thereafter the author will consider the domestic application of the parol evidence rule and 
selected SCA cases on interpretation. Finally, the author will compare the VCLT approach with 
our domestic approach to interpretation and in particular the admissibility of evidence. 
 
Through this process, the author seeks to evaluate the suitability (or not) of the South African 
domestic approach to interpretation and our rules regarding the admission of evidence in the 
interpretation of DTCs.  
1.3 Research method 
 
Legal research is traditionally classified as doctrinal, theoretical and reform orientated, 
although these three categories are in no way all encompassing.25 Regardless of the approach 
 
23 Ibid  
24 Krok and another v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services (2015) 18 ITLR 42 at 46. 
25 Teresa M. Pidduck Tax research methodology for untested legislation: An exemplar for the tax scholar, South 
African Journal of Accounting Research (2019), Vol 33(3), 205 at 208.   
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adopted, legal research needs to be conducted by way of a process that is systematic, 
purposeful and conducted within a robust framework.26   
It is generally agreed that doctrinal research is the most accepted method of legal research.27 
It has been described as the traditional or ‘black-letter’ law approach and is characterised by 
a systematic process of identifying, analysing, organising and synthesising statutes, case law 
and commentary.28 This is typically regarded as a library based undertaking, focused on 
reading and scholarly analysis.29 Doctrinal research has also been described as research which 
provides a systematic exposition of rules governing a legal issue, analyses relationships 
between rules, considers areas of difficulty and predicts development.30 
A doctrinal approach has been applied as part of this study, following a structure in 
accordance with the recommended steps described by Hutchinson & Duncan including31: 
• Assembling the relevant facts.  
• Identifying and analysing the legal issues with a view on focusing the search for 
applicable law. 
• Reading background material (including commentary from international authors, 
textbooks, journal articles). 
• Locating primary material (multilateral and bilateral conventions, statutes, case law). 
• Synthesising all the issues and material in context.  
• Reaching a conclusion.  
The study will therefore include: 
• Assembly of facts - As indicated previously the focus of this study will revolve around 
the South African domestic approach to interpretation and the admissibility of 
extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of DTCs against the background facts of the 
recent tax court judgment of ABC Proprietary Limited. 
 
26 Margaret McKerchar “Philosophical Paradigms, Inquire Strategies and Knowledge Claims: Applying the 
Principles of Research Design and Conduct to Taxation” (2008), Vol 6(1) eJournal of Tax Research 5. 
27 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan "Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research." Deakin 
Law Review (Oct 2012), vol. 17(1), p. 83-120 at 102. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Hutchinson & Duncan op cit note 27 at 101. 
31 Ibid at 106. 
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• Identify the legal issues to be considered – The study considers whether the South 
African domestic principles regarding interpretation and the admissibility of evidence 
would apply equally when interpreting a DTC, or whether customary international law 
and in particular the guidelines set out in the VCLT would require a deviation from 
these principles. The author also considers the relevance of foreign judgments as an 
interpretational aid.  
•  Reading background material – The author will conduct a comprehensive review of 
past and current commentaries on the interpretation of international tax treaties and 
analyse the South African domestic approach to interpretation with reference to 
contemporary case law and commentary. 
• Identify primary material - Consideration will be given to the applicable bilateral 
treaties, the VCLT and applicable case law on both treaty interpretation and the 
application of the parol evidence rule under domestic law. 
• Conclusion – Following the conclusion of the study the author hopes to provide more 
clarity on the relationship between South Africa’s domestic rules on the admissibility 
of extrinsic evidence and the guidelines provided under the VCLT.  
1.4  Limitations of study 
 
This study will be limited to the narrow issue of comparing the South African approach to 
interpretation and evidence admissibility with the customary international law principles as 
reflected in the VCLT. It is not intended as a general commentary on the correct approach to 
interpretation under South African law.32  The study is furthermore not intended as a general 
summary of the current South African approach to the interpretation of DTCs as evidenced 
by past case law.33  
 
32 For a recent article that considers the current state of contractual interpretation in South African Law, see 
Franziska Myburgh Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Paradigm Shifts, and Crises: Analysing 
recent changes in the Approach to Contractual Interpretation in South African Law (2017) Vol 3 SALJ 514. 
33 For a general summary of the South African approach to the interpretation of treaties, see Izelle du Plessis, 
Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of Tax Treaties in South Africa (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 31. 
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1.5  Chapter outline 
 
Chapter 1 – This chapter introduces the background giving rise to the legal issue under 
consideration and explains the purpose and intended outcome of the study. It also explains 
the research methodology that will be employed as part of the study, the limitations that will 
apply and summarises the chapter structure.  
Chapter 2 – This chapter will consider the rules of interpretation provided under the VCLT 
with a focus on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence and international commentary on the 
application of the VCLT. Following this analysis, the chapter will provide a conclusion on 
evidence admissibility under the VCLT. 
Chapter 3 – This chapter will consider the South African domestic approach to interpretation 
and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence. This will be done with reference to case law and 
academic commentary. Following this analysis, the study will provide a summary on the 
current approach to interpretation and the application of the parol evidence rule under 
domestic law.  
Chapter 4 – This chapter will compare the approaches to admissibility as discussed in chapters 
2 and 3. The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain whether there is any material differences 
between the two approaches, and if so, whether this would justify a variation from the 
ordinary domestic rules of interpretation and the admission of evidence when interpreting a 
DTC in South Africa.  
Chapter 5 – This chapter provides a summary of the main findings from the previous chapters 
and concludes with an overall finding on the question of whether there is a basis (if any) for 
distinguishing between the approach to interpretation and admissibility of evidence in the 




CHAPTER 2 – INTERPRETATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VCLT 
 
2.1  Nature of a DTC 
 
DTCs unlike ordinary domestic legislation, have a dual nature in that they are international 
agreements concluded between states which limits their respective fiscal jurisdiction, while 
also forming part of the domestic tax law of each state.34 This is no different in South Africa, 
where DTCs are incorporated into domestic law by virtue of the application of section 108 of 
the ITA which provides that upon approval by Parliament of the DTC and its publication in the 
Government Gazette, the DTC shall have effect as if enacted in the ITA.35  Guidance on the 
process by which a treaty comes into existence and is adopted under South African domestic 
law is not considered in further detail for present purposes.36    
A DTC assumes that both states will continue to apply their respective domestic tax laws and 
therefore alters the application of the domestic law by either excluding the application of 
domestic law in one of the contracting states or by obligating one of the states to provide a 
credit in relation to taxes imposed under its domestic law.37 Contrary to what has been 
indicated in ABC Proprietary Limited38, a DTC therefore does not elect the domestic law of 
one state to apply to the exclusion of another (as would be the case under private 
international law), but rather limits the application of each state’s domestic law and is 
therefore more appropriately described as ‘international administration law’.39 
2.2 The role of the VCLT in the Interpretation of Treaties 
 
Although local courts often interpret DTCs in accordance with ordinary domestic 
interpretation rules, as indicated above it remains an international agreement and as such 
 
34 Philip Baker Double Tax Conventions 3 ed Release 27 (2014) para B.01. 
35 Section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act.  
36 For further guidance see John Dugard Dugard’s International Law – A South African Perspective 5 ed (2018) 
at 610; Lynette Olivier & Michael Honiball International Tax, a South African Perspective 5 ed (2011) at 293; 
see also Baker op cit note 34 para C.01 on the conclusion and negotiation of treaties. 
37 Klaus Vogel Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation (1986) Vol 4(1) ITBL 14. 
38 ABC Proprietary Limited supra note 1 para 19. 
39 Vogel op cit note 37. 
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forms part of international law.40 Botha states that where a treaty is incorporated by 
reference into domestic law (as per section 108(2) of the ITA), the treaty will remain intact as 
an international agreement and the customary international law rules of treaty interpretation 
will apply.41 In this regard it is widely accepted that articles 31 to 33 of the VCLT constitutes a 
codification of the customary international law rules of interpretation.42 
2.3 Role of Customary International Law in South Africa 
 
In terms of section 232 of the South African Constitution, customary international law is 
regarded as law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution.43 As such, it 
enjoys a status at least equal to that of domestic legislation and common law and must be 
accounted for accordingly by our domestic courts.44  
Section 233 of the Constitution further provides that when interpreting any legislation 
(including DTCs that have been incorporated into our domestic legislation by virtue of section 
108(2) of the ITA), a court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation (treaty) 
that is consistent with international law over any other interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law.  
The generally accepted sources of international law include amongst others treaties, 
international custom, general principles of law and the judicial decisions and teachings of 
highly qualified publicists.45 As such the VCLT constitutes a source of international law and 
will therefore have to be taken into account by a South African court in the interpretation of 
legislation. The SCA has also previously confirmed that a court must have regard to the rules 
 
40 John F Avery Jones Treaty Interpretation Global Tax Treaty Commentaries IBFD (2018) para 1.1.1; M. Lang, 
Introduction to the Law of Double Taxation Conventions 2 ed (2013), IBFD Online Books para 4.1. 
41 NJ Botha ‘International Law’ in The Law of South Africa 2 ed vol 11 (2008) para 447; Baker op cit note 34 
para E.03.  
42 Baker op cit note 34 para E.03; Dugard op cit note 36 at 608; Olivier op cit note 36 at 308. 
43 Section 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
44 Botha op cit note 41 para 453 
45 Ibid para 437 were the author refers to the sources listed under article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. 
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applicable to the interpretation of treaties (as contained in the VCLT) when interpreting a 
DTC, as these rules are binding customary international law.46  
Lastly both the SCA and the UK Court of Appeal have previously accepted that the VCLT will 
apply to both signatories and non-signatories (such as South Africa), given that it constitutes 
customary international law.47  
2.4  The Vienna Convention 
 
Before analysing the rules of interpretation set out in the VCLT, it is important to consider the 
original intention behind the introduction of these rules.  In this regard, guidance can be found 
in the Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) that provided commentary on the 
draft articles of the VCLT (the Commentary).48 
The Commentary acknowledges the three traditional approaches to interpretation as is also 
common in domestic law, i.e. the textual, subjective and teleological approach.49  In short, 
the textual approach emphasises the primacy of the text and the need to give effect to the 
grammatical meaning of the words as the authentic expression of the parties’ intention and 
is normally associated with a strict limitation on the admission of extrinsic evidence.50 The 
subjective approach emphasises the intention of the parties and admits liberal recourse to 
extrinsic evidence in establishing the intention of the parties.51 Finally, the teleological 
approach emphasises the object and purpose of the document being interpreted and is 
generally more willing to go beyond the text in achieving purpose.52 
Although the ILC acknowledged that it would be inadvisable to try and attempt a prescriptive 
codification of the principles of interpretation (given that they depend on the particular 
context and circumstances), it nevertheless emphasised that the ILC must take a clear position 
 
46 Krok op cit note 21 para 27. 
47 See Krok op cit note 21 para 27; Ben Nevis (Holdings) Ltd v Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 2013 EWCA 
Civ 578 para 17; see also Baker op cit note 34 para E.03 for a list of international cases in which the VCLT has 
been referred to as part of interpreting DTCs. 
48 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 July 1966, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/6309/Rev.1) available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm last accessed on 21 April 2020.  
49 Ibid at 218. 
50 Ibid; see also Dugard op cit note 36 at 622. 




in regard to the role of the text in treaty interpretation, given the divergent approaches to 
interpretation.53 Notwithstanding this stated intention, some authors have criticised the VCLT 
for being wide enough to support any of the three interpretive approaches.54 
The Commentary regards these approaches as constituting for the most part principles of 
logic and good sense and that they are only valuable as guides to assist in appreciating the 
meaning which the parties may have intended to attach to the text55. The ILC therefore 
confined itself to codifying a few key principles which it considered to constitute the generally 
accepted rules of treaty interpretation.56 These principles are contained in article 31 and 32 
of the VCLT and are set out in Appendix A below.  
It is important to note that the ILC intended for all these elements to be considered as a 
singular and closely integrated ‘general rule of interpretation’. The process of interpretation 
should therefore involve a unitary exercise in which all the elements are thrown into a crucible 
to deliver the relevant interpretation.57 The elements making up article 31 should not be 
applied in a rigid hierarchical fashion with one element taking preference over another.  
Unlike the elements of article 31 which all relate to the agreement between the parties at the 
time when or after it received expression in the text, the supplementary means and 
preparatory work contemplated in article 32 does not have the same authentic character. As 
such the ILC noted that considerable discretion must be exercised in determining the value of 
supplementary means as an element of interpretation.58  Despite this, the ILC’s intention is 
not to draw a rigid line between the use of article 31 and 32, but rather that there should be 
a general link between the application of article 31 and the use of supplementary 
interpretative aids to confirm the result emanating from the general rule of interpretation.59 
As Vogel and Prokisch explain, the VCLT identifies the most important elements of 
 
53 Ibid at 219. 
54 See Brian Arnold The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myth and Reality (2010) Vol 64(1) BIT para 3.2; Dugard 
op cit note 36 at 608, Lang op cit note 40 para 4.1. 
55 Commentary on the VCLT op cit note 48 at 218. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid at 220; see also Avery Jones op cit note 40 para 3.4.1.  
58 Commentary on the VCLT op cit note 48 at 220. 
59 Ibid.  
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interpretation and puts them in a relationship to each other to aid the interpreter to assign 
relative weights to the different elements.60 
2.4.1 Article 31  
 
Paragraph 1 provides that the treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose. Four elements can therefore be identified. The author deals with each of 
these below. 
2.4.1.1  Good faith 
 
The Commentary states that the concept of good faith flows from the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda.61 Where a treaty is open to two interpretations, one of which does and the other 
which does not enable the treaty to have its appropriate effect, good faith and the object and 
purpose of the treaty will demand that the former interpretation should be adopted. 
However, this would not call for an extensive or liberal interpretation that goes beyond the 
expressed or necessarily implied terms of the treaty. Avery Jones considers the application of 
good faith to require that the technicalities of interpretation should not apply and that good 
faith interpretation is to be determined with reference to compelling standards of honesty, 
fairness and reasonableness prevailing in the international community at such time.62   
2.4.1.2  Ordinary meaning 
 
Furthermore, the parties are presumed to have such intention as appears from the ordinary 
meaning of the text used by them and that the text must be presumed to be the authentic 
expression of the parties’ intention.63 The starting point of interpretation is therefore an 
elucidation of the text’s meaning and not an investigation ab initio into the intention of the 
contracting parties. With reference to a judgment of the ICJ, the Commentary furthermore 
emphasises that it is not the function of interpretation to revise a treaty or read terms into 
 
60 Klaus Vogel & Rainer G. Prokisch Interpretation of Double Tax Conventions, IFA Cahiers vol. 78a (1993), 
Online Books IBFD at 67. 
61 Commentary on the VCLT op cit note 48 at 221. 
62 Avery Jones op cit note 40 para 3.4.3. 
63 Commentary on the VCLT op cit note 48 at 221. 
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them which they do not expressly or by implication contain.64  This is illustrative of the article’s 
textual approach to interpretation. As Vogel states, the subjective intention of the parties is 
rejected and only relevant to the extent expressed in the text.65 However, as indicated before, 
the ordinary meaning must not be determined in the abstract, but in the context of the treaty 
and having regard to the object and purpose. 
2.4.1.3  Context 
 
As to what constitutes context for purposes of treaty interpretation, paragraph 2 of article 31 
attempts to define this concept. According to paragraph 2, this includes the entire text of the 
treaty, the preamble, and any annexures to the treaty. In addition the context includes any 
agreements between the contracting parties in relation to the conclusion of the treaty and 
any instrument which was made by one or more of the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and which instrument has been accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty.  
The Commentary states that this definition of context has been based on the principle that 
unilateral documents cannot be regarded as context for purposes of article 31 unless said 
documents were made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and have been 
accepted by the other parties.66  
It is further indicated that context should not be regarded as mere evidence to which recourse 
may be had in the case of ambiguity, but rather that it should inform the unitary process of 
ascertaining the ordinary meaning contemplated in paragraph 1.67 
Vogel commenting on paragraph 2 states that this would include explanations on the DTC 
provided at the time of conclusion provided these have been accepted by both parties.68 This 
could include letters and notes exchanged by the parties during the signing of the treaty. 
Unilateral expressions of intent such as technical explanations and oral statements by people 
involved in the negotiation process that have not been expressly confirmed by the other side, 
 
64 Ibid referring to the case of United States Nationals in Morocco case, I.C.J Reports 1952 at 196 and 199. 
65 Vogel op cit note 37 at 35. 
66 Commentary on the VCLT op cit note 48 at 221. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Vogel & Prokisch op cit note 60 at 69. 
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cannot be regarded as context under paragraph 2.69 These are regarded as supplementary 
means of interpretation at best (see discussion below).70 
2.4.1.4  Subsequent agreements and practice 
 
Paragraph 3 provides that there shall be taken into account together with the context any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions, any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation and any relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.  
This would be subject to the restriction that any subsequent agreement or practice that alters 
the original text of a treaty, would only be effective to the extent that it complies with the 
applicable domestic treaty implementation requirements (e.g. parliamentary approval under 
section 108(2) of the ITA).71  
Save for a formal amendment of the text as contemplated above, Vogel comments that 
subsequent agreements and practice cannot change the content of the treaty and must 
remain within the scope of interpretation.72 
As to the reason for splitting up paragraph 2 and 3, Avery Jones suggests that this is to 
distinguish between the contemporaneous intrinsic elements in paragraph 2, and the 
extrinsic elements such as subsequent agreements and practice in paragraph 3.73 
Notwithstanding this distinction and the fact that the phrase “together with the context” 
might suggest that the items listed in paragraph 3 are to be regarded as being of lesser 
importance than the context in paragraph 2, this is not the case. As previously indicated, the 
 
69 Ibid; see also Avery Jones op cit note 40 para 3.4.5.2. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Vogel op cit note 37 at 35; Avery Jones op cit note 40 para 3.4.5.6. 
72 Vogel & Prokisch op cit note 60 at 70. 
73 Avery Jones op cit note 40 para 3.4.5.4. 
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elements of article 31 are not arranged hierarchically and one element should therefore not 
take preference over another.74  
2.4.1.5  Object and purpose 
 
The final element provides that the treaty must be interpreted in light of its object and 
purpose. In this regard the commentary mentions that the ICJ has on more than one occasion 
had recourse to the object and purpose of a treaty as reflected in the preamble to interpret 
a particular provision.75  
Vogel contends that the purpose referred to in the VCLT is not the subjective intention of the 
contracting parties, but rather the overall goal of the entire treaty and not the purpose of a 
single treaty provision.76 The overall purpose of a DTC is generally considered to be the 
avoidance of double tax, the fair distribution of tax revenues, the elimination of tax barriers 
to trade, the encouragement of foreign investment and the avoidance of double non-
taxation.77   
However, the function of purpose as an interpretative aid is subordinated to the text and 
should merely elucidate the terms of the treaty.78 It does not function as an independent 
means of interpretation.79 Given these limitations, the utility of purpose in the interpretation 
process is questioned by some authors.80  
2.4.1.6  Special meaning 
 
Finally, paragraph 4 provides that a special meaning can be attributed to a term if it is 
established that the parties so intended. The Commentary indicates that this is intended to 
cover those exceptional cases where notwithstanding the apparent meaning of a term in its 
context, it is established that the parties intended for a special or technical meaning to 
 
74 This view is confirmed by Avery Jones op cit note 40 para 3.4.5.4. 
75 Commentary on the VCLT op cit note 48 at 221. 
76 Ibid; see also Alexander Rust et al, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 4 ed (2015), Kluwer Law 
International at 39.  
77 Vogel & Prokisch op cit note 60 at 72. 
78 Vogel op cit note 37 at 35. 
79 Rust op cit note 76 at 39. 
80 Vogel & Prokisch op cit note 60 at 72. 
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apply.81 The burden of proof will fall on the party alleging the existence of a special meaning.82 
It is therefore presumed that a party should be able to lead evidence as to its subjective 
intention to prove the existence of a special meaning.  
2.4.2 Article 32  
 
2.4.2.1  Supplementary means of interpretation  
 
Article 32 the VCLT provides that recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion (i.e. the travaux préparatoires) in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 31. It can only be used to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a 
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.  
Importantly there is no limitation under article 32 on the admissibility of supplementary 
means as part of the interpretative process, it merely limits the use of said information.83  This 
accords with the VCLT’s textual approach to interpretation as discussed above.  
With respect to article 32, the Commentary provides that the object of interpretation is the 
elucidation of the treaty text and not an investigation ab initio of the parties’ supposed 
intention.84 However, it is acknowledged that it would be unrealistic to have no recourse to 
extrinsic material such as the travaux préparatoires until such time as the application of article 
31 renders a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.85 Accordingly it was decided 
that the supplementary means can be introduced from the outset as part of the interpretation 
process contemplated in article 31 to confirm the meaning.86  
The supplementary means do not provide for an alternative or autonomous means of 
interpretation, but only serves to aid the interpretive process governed by the general rule 
 
81 Commentary on the VCLT op cit note 48 at 222. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Arnold op cit note 54 para 54. 





under article 31.87 Where the application of the general rule results in ambiguity or leads to a 
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, the supplementary means can be used to 
determine the meaning. This exception must however be strictly limited and should be 
confined to those cases where the interpretation under article 31 provides a manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable result.88 
In other words where the meaning derived from the supplementary means  does not confirm 
the  ordinary meaning resulting from the application of article 31 (assuming this meaning is 
not ambiguous or manifestly absurd or unreasonable), it will not be able to override the 
ordinary meaning.89 Alternatively to this view, it could be argued that the supplementary 
means may in fact demonstrate another possible meaning under article 31 which can then be 
confirmed by the supplementary means, or it may disclose an ambiguity not previously 
recognised that can then be resolved through the supplementary means.90 
The ILC decided against defining the ambit of travaux préparatoires for fear that this might 
inadvertently exclude relevant evidence.91 Vogel indicates that this would generally not 
include unilateral material such as technical explanations, reports to the senate/parliament 
or memorandum accompanying a draft of the treaty implementing legislation, as these only 
represent the subjective interpretation of only one treaty partner. 92 These items would only 
fall under article 32 to the extent that they reproduce notes or exchanged letters between 
initialling and final signature (i.e. representing bilateral intention).93 Therefore documents 
that do not meet this requirement would not be admissible as part of interpreting a treaty.94  
Avery Jones also cautions against the use of unilateral material, stating that this can only be 
used where there is certainty regarding the acceptance thereof by the other contracting 
 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Avery Jones op cit note 40 para 3.5.1.2. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Commentary on the VCLT op cit note 48 at 223. 
92 Vogel op cit note 37 at 36 ; see also Vogel & Prokisch op cit note 60 at 74. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Rust op cit note 76 at 40. 
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state.95 Over and above the travaux préparatoires, he considers the following as possible 
examples of supplementary means:  
i) the wording of other tax treaties to which one of the parties is a party; 
ii) foreign court decisions on the same treaty wording; 
iii) domestic law in the treaty partner states;  
iv) Commentaries on the OECD Model; and 
v) the writings of experts.96 
Unfortunately, the basis for admissibility of the abovementioned sources under the VCLT are 
often left unstated in judgments.97  Hattingh commenting on the Krok judgment, mentions 
our courts’ failure to clarify the status of the OECD Commentary under the VCLT.98 Based on 
the court’s reliance on the Ben Nevis judgment, it would however appear to have been 
treated as supplementary means under article 32.99 
Although the Commentary suggests that article 32 would cover published as well as 
unpublished, but accessible travaux préparatoires100, Avery Jones notes that the travaux 
préparatoires is normally of little importance in the interpretation of DTCs as they are 
generally inaccessible.101 
With reference to the phrase “the circumstances of its conclusion”, which typically relates to 
the historical setting in which the treaty was entered into, he notes that this is unlikely to 
have much relevance given that DTCs are usually not entered into by virtue of a particular 
historical imperative.102 The author considers that this would not always be the case and that 
sometimes a country might have a particular historical or domestic imperative that 
 
95 Avery Jones op cit note 40 para 3.5.1.4. 
96 Ibid para 3.4.90 and para 3.5.1.4; see also Jonathan Schwarz ‘Tax Treaty Interpretation after Ben Nevis 
(Holdings) Ltd v Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (2013)’ 2014 Vol 68(1) BIT para 5.1 to 5.7 where the 
admissibility of a number of these supplementary sources were considered by the author in light of the 
judgment in Ben Nevis (Holdings) Ltd v Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.  
97 See Schwarz  op cit note 96 para 5.1  
98 Hattingh op cit note 24 at 47. 
99 Hattingh op cit note 24 referring to the court’s reliance on Ben Nevis (Holdings) Ltd v Revenue and Customs 
Comrs (2013) 15 ITLR 1003; see also Income Tax Case No 1878 77 SATC 349. 
100 Commentary on the VCLT op cit note 48 at 223. 
101 Avery Jones op cit note 40 para 3.5.1.3; see also the Canadian Tax court case of Klaboe v Her Majesty the 
Queen (2007) 9 ITLR 1099 where the taxpayer obtained an order compelling the discovery of the travaux 




necessitates a change in its DTCs, as was the case in South Africa with the introduction of DWT 
and the resultant conclusion of a number of protocols to its existing treaties to provide for a 
withholding tax at source. 
2.4.2.2  Foreign Judgments as an interpretative aid 
 
Although foreign judgments do not necessarily fit into the ambit of supplementary means, 
they are generally accepted as relevant to the interpretation process by most international 
commentators.103  The author agrees that in the interest of common interpretation of DTCs 
and given the desirability of uniform interpretation, domestic courts must be aware of, and 
take account of how these provisions have been interpreted by courts in other jurisdictions 
(especially where this relates to the same treaty wording), regardless of its particular 
classification under the VCLT.104  
There has also been a growing number of international cases in which the courts have 
referred to foreign judgments in pursuance of the principle of common interpretation.105 As 
to the correct approach to be applied in the use of foreign judgments, the often-quoted 
extract from the UK case of Fothergill v Monarch Airlines is repeated below: 
“As respects decision of foreign courts, the persuasive value of a particular court's 
decision must depend on its reputation and its status, the extent to which its decisions 
are binding on courts of co-ordinate and inferior jurisdiction in its own country and the 
coverage of the national law reporting system.”106  
Baker is of the view that courts should consider and preferably follow the relevant decisions 
of other courts, unless they are convinced that those decisions are wrong.107 Vogel in turn 
 
103 Baker op cit note 34 para E.26; Avery Jones op cit note 40 para 3.5.1.6; Vogel op cit note 37 at 39; W 
Wijnen, Some Thoughts on the Convergence and Tax Treaty Interpretation (2013) Vol 67(11) BIT; David Ward 
Use of foreign court decisions in interpreting tax treaties in Guglielmo Maisto (ed) Courts and Tax Treaty Law 
(2007)  Vol 3 para 7.6. 
104 Baker op cit note 34 para E.27; Vogel op cit note 37 at 37. 
105 See Baker op cit note 34 para E.28 where he refers to a number of jurisdictions in which foreign judgments 
have been considered as part of the interpretation of DTCs. See for example Australia: Thiel v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 171 CLR 338; Commissioner of Taxation v Lamesa Holdings BV (1997) FCA 
785. Canada: R v Crown Forest Industries Limited (1995) 2 S.C.R 802; UK: IRC v Commerzbank AG (1990) STC 
285; Memec plc v IRC (1998) All ER (D) 255.      
106 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines (1980) 2 All ER 696 at 708; these principles have been approved by Vogel op 
cit note 37 at 38. 
107 Baker op cit note 34 para E.26. 
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states that foreign case law should not be accepted as binding without review, and supports 
the approach as described in Fothergill above, i.e. that the persuasive value of foreign 
decisions depends on amongst other things, the reputation and rank of the foreign court in 
question.108  
Vogel further states that a judge interpreting a DTC is obliged to consider the decisions of 
foreign courts, at least those that are brought to his attention by the parties and that relates 
to the treaty in question.109 A judge should use all reasonable means available to him/her to 
find relevant foreign case law on the treaty under consideration.110 However, he admits that 
the threshold of what would be regarded as reasonable, would often be exceeded quite easily 
given the limited access to foreign tax judgments and the foreign language barrier.  
As indicated before, Avery Jones considers that foreign judgments on the same treaty wording 
qualifies as supplementary means of interpretation and can therefore be used in accordance 
with article 32.111 He emphasises that a domestic court, while being aware of such judgments, 
would not necessarily be bound to follow them, but that this awareness will  help to ensure a 
common interpretation of widely used treaty provisions.112  
He also acknowledges that given the relatively small amount of litigation on tax treaties in 
most jurisdictions, most domestic judges typically have limited experience with the 
interpretation of treaties, and therefore the benefit to be gained from considering foreign 
judgments is significant.113  
The author considers that many of the original concerns identified by Vogel regarding access 
to foreign decisions, although very applicable at the time of writing his article in 1986, have 
since become less relevant given the development of the internet, easier access to translated 
case law and translation services. It is therefore considered that where a domestic court 
interprets a DTC, they must take account of foreign judgements on the same issue, subject to 
 
108 Vogel op cit note 37 at 38-39. 
109 Vogel op cit note 37 at 39. 
110 Ibid. 





the considerations set out in Fothergill. Furthermore, this should not be limited to only 
decisions on the same treaty but should also include decisions on the same treaty wording.114 
2.4.3 Summary of VCLT Provisions 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, the author has attempted to provide a summary of the 
elements contained in articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. This summary considers the admissibility 
of these elements and how they should be used as part of the interpretation process. The 
summary is set out in Appendix B. 
2.4.4 Conclusion on the application of the VCLT 
 
As indicated before, the VCLT was never intended to codify the principles of treaty 
interpretation, but rather to serve as a general guide by documenting a number of key 
principles that have traditionally been followed in the interpretation of treaties.  
Although the VCLT prescribes the material that can be admitted as context for purposes of 
applying the general rule of interpretation, it says very little about how this material should 
subsequently be used as part of the interpretive process. The actual process of interpretation 
therefore remains an exercise of the interpreter’s judgment.115 As Waibel states: 
“A central reason for the open-ended character of the VCLT’s principles of 
interpretation is that Article 31 leaves it to each treaty interpreter how to mix the four 
elements of the crucible....Article 31 is silent on the question how much weight treaty 
interpreters ought to give to each of the four elements…”116 
The interpreter can consider supplementary means (which includes a variety of extrinsic 
materials) and use such information within the confines of article 32. Importantly though, 
 
114 Ibid. 
115 Avery Jones op cit note 40 para 3.6. 
116 Michael Waibel Principles of Treaty Interpretation Developed for and Applied by National Courts? (2015) 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, University of Cambridge, Paper No. 16/2015 available at 
http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/; Arnold op cit note 54 para 3.2 is also especially critical of the VCLT’s utility in 
practice given this vagueness. 
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article 32 at no stage limits the admissibility of such material as part of the interpretative 
process.117   
Given that article 31 and 32 must be applied as part of a unitary process, this then leads to 
the question of how this supplementary material should be admitted as part of the 
interpretative approach. As Arnold critically explains: 
“Nevertheless, attempting to limit the use of information without limiting access to the 
information does not accurately reflect how the interpretive process actually takes 
place. If a judge or other interpreter consults supplementary material that clearly 
suggest that a treaty provision should be interpreted in a particular way (even in a way 
other than that suggested by the application of the rules in Art. 31), it is unrealistic 
(and defies common sense) to assume that he would then be able to disregard or limit 
the use or the weight to be given to the material. Once material has been taken into 
account, the only issue is the weight to be given to it…Art 31 is so vague and general 
and self-evident that it cannot provide any real guidance for – or control over – the 
interpretative process. Art 32, which appears to be more rule-like, is equally 
meaningless because it allows reference to supplementary materials in all instances, 
but then attempts to limit the use (but not the weight) of such material.”118 
Although the author agrees that the general rule provided by the VCLT leaves a degree of 
discretion to the interpreter and that the approach to supplementary material under article 
32 could have been more clear on the issue of admissibility (particularly as far as it relates to 
the interaction of article 32 with the general rule), it is nevertheless considered that the VCLT 
 




provides a useful guide that should be considered and applied by domestic courts when 
interpreting treaties. In particular the VCLT: 
I) Affirms the primacy of the treaty text. Although the interpreter might have a 
degree of discretion under the general rule, there is a distinct emphasis on the 
primacy of the text. 
II) Confirms the use of a unitary interpretative process in which the text is considered 
in good faith together with the treaty’s context, object and purpose.  
III) Expressly defines what material should be considered as part of context. 
IV) Admits supplementary means of interpretation in all instances as part of the 
unitary process, albeit that the use of this information is limited under article 32. 
The author now proceeds to consider the domestic approach to interpretation that has 
been applied by South African courts and in particular their approach to the admissibility 




CHAPTER 3 – SOUTH AFRICAN DOMESTIC APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION   
 
There has been (and arguably always will be) some academic debate in South Africa about 
the correct approach to the interpretation of documents, in particular whether this should be 
a subjective or objective approach.119  However, the focus of this thesis is not to provide a 
critical analysis of the South African domestic approach to interpretation, but rather to 
consider the interpretative principles of the VCLT in comparison with the most commonly 
applied approach to interpretation in South Africa, in order determine whether the VCLT 
would demand a change in practice from our ordinary domestic principles where a court is 
tasked with interpreting a DTC.  
This discussion will therefore focus on the approach as originally set out by Wallis JA in the 
case of Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality, given that this approach 
has subsequently been widely adopted and endorsed by courts throughout South Africa.120  
In particular, the recent Constitutional Court judgment of Airports Company South Africa v Big 
Five Duty Free (Pty) Ltd and Others  stated that there is no longer a dispute about the 
principles of interpretation in South Africa.121 The highest court in the country has expressly 
endorsed  the approach of Wallis JA as set out in Endumeni as the correct approach.122 This 
endorsement follows a series of approvals by the Constitutional Court and the SCA of the 
Endumeni approach.123 
 
119 Myburgh op cit note 32; see also Blair Atholl supra note 16 para 55 to 61 where the court summarises the 
various academic views on the issue.   
120 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 594 (SCA) para 18. 
121 Airports Company South Africa v Big Five Duty Free (Pty) Ltd and Others (2018) ZACC 33 para 29. 
122 Airports Company supra note 121 para 29.  
123 Endumeni has been cited with approval by the Constitutional Court in National Credit Regulator v 
Opperman 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) at fn 105 and AMCU v Chamber of Mines of South Africa 2017 (3) SA 242 (CC) at 
fn 28. It has also been cited with approval in various SCA judgments such as Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) 
Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA) para 12; Firstrand Bank Ltd v Land and 
Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa 2015 (1) SA 38 (SCA) para 27; Novartis SA (Pty) Ltd v Maphil 
Trading (Pty) Ltd 2016 (1) SA 518 (SCA) para 28; The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Blair Atholl 
Homeowners Association 2019 (3) SA 398 (SCA) para 61; Telkom SA Soc Limited v CSARS 2020 ZASCA 19 
(unreported case 239/19) para 17; CSARS v United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd 2020 ZASCA 16 
(unreported case 264/19) para 8. 
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3.1 The Endumeni approach 
 
The present-day approach to interpretation was described by Wallis JA in 2012 as follows: 
“The present state of the law can be expressed as follows: Interpretation is the process 
of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it legislation, some other 
statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by reading 
the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the 
circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the 
document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light of the 
ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the 
apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those responsible 
for its production. Where more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be 
weighed in the light of all these factors. The process is objective, not subjective. A 
sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike 
results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to, 
and guard against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable, 
sensible or businesslike for the words actually used. To do so in regard to a statute or 
statutory instrument is to cross the divide between interpretation and legislation; in a 
contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties other than the one they in 
fact made. The 'inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision itself', 
read in context and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the background 
to the preparation and production of the document.”124 (emphasis added and 
footnotes omitted) 
The judgement continues by emphasising that the approach described above is a unitary one 
and that one must consider from the outset the words used in the context of the document 
as a whole and in light of all the relevant circumstances, with neither predominating over the 
other.125  It is  further stated that courts should not set out to undermine the legislative 
 
124 Endumeni supra note 120 para 18. 
125 Ibid para 19 and 24. 
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purpose, but rather to give it effect within the constraints imposed by the language adopted 
by the legislature.126   
Endumeni therefore presents a unitary objective approach to interpretation in which the 
interpreter should take account of the wording of the text together with the context, the 
apparent purpose of the document and the circumstances of its coming into existence, which 
includes the material know to those responsible for its production.  
Furthermore a sensible meaning (i.e. one that doesn’t undermine the apparent purpose of 
the document) should be preferred. However the primacy of the text remains and 
interpreters are cautioned against substituting the actual text for their subjective views of 
what is considered sensible or businesslike.  
The judgment unfortunately does not elaborate on what material should be regarded as 
admissible for purposes of informing this unitary approach, i.e. what is considered context 
and what would constitute admissible evidence. Some guidance on this issue can found in the 
subsequent case of Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) 
Bpk. 127 In this case one of the parties cited the earlier ‘golden rule’ approach to interpretation 
as set out in Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant which provides that: 
“The correct approach to the application of the 'golden rule' of interpretation after 
having ascertained the literal meaning of the word or phrase in question is, broadly 
speaking, to have regard: 
(1)    to the context in which the word or phrase is used with its interrelation to the 
contract as a whole, including the nature and purpose of the contract… 
(2)    to the background circumstances which explain the genesis and purpose of the 
contract, ie to matters probably present to the minds of the parties when they 
contracted… 
(3)    to apply extrinsic evidence regarding the surrounding circumstances when the 
language of the document is on the face of it ambiguous, by considering 
 
126 Ibid para 22. 
127 Bothma-Batho supra note 123. 
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previous negotiations and correspondence between the parties, subsequent 
conduct of the parties showing the sense in which they acted on the document, 
save direct evidence of their own intentions...”128  
The golden rule approach contemplates a staggered consideration of evidence in which the 
ordinary meaning is first established in isolation, and only thereafter should context, purpose 
and background circumstances inform the process. Only where this meaning is ambiguous, 
can surrounding circumstances (i.e. evidence as to previous negotiations, correspondence, 
and subsequent conduct, but excluding direct evidence of the parties’ intention) be taken into 
account.  
Wallis JA states in Bothma-Batho that this is no longer the approach to be adopted by South 
African courts and reaffirms the Endumeni approach. Although the starting point remains the 
wording of the text, the process of interpretation does not stop at the perceived literal 
meaning of those words, but rather considers them in light of all the relevant and admissible 
context, including the circumstances under which the document came into being.129  
Furthermore, the distinction under the golden rule between background and surrounding 
circumstances has fallen away and the approach no longer occurs in stages, but rather as a 
unitary exercise.130 Bothma-Batho confirms that the Endumeni approach reflects recent 
developments in regard to contractual interpretation, including the principles as enunciated 
in the case of KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd and Another.131 This case is 
considered in further detail below in relation to the admission of extrinsic evidence and the 
Parol Evidence rule. 
In Firstrand Bank Ltd v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa, Wallis JA 
again elaborated on the Endumeni approach, stating that it was incumbent on counsel to 
identify the meaning for which they contended, in order for it to be tested against the actual 
 
128 Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768. 
129 Bothma-Batho supra note 123 para 12.  
130 Ibid. 
131 Bothma-Batho supra note 123 para 11 referring to KPMG supra note 123. 
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words used.132 If the words of the document are unable to bear the meaning argued for, then 
such meaning will be impermissible.133 
A year after the Firstrand judgment, the Endumeni approach was again considered by the SCA 
in Novartis SA (Pty) Ltd v Maphil Trading (Pty) Ltd.134 Lewis JA who has traditionally advocated 
for a subjective approach to interpretation states the following in respect of the Endumeni 
approach: 
“I do not understand these judgments to mean that interpretation is a process that 
takes into account only the objective meaning of the words (if that is ascertainable), 
and does not have regard to the contract as a whole or the circumstances in which it 
was entered into. This court has consistently held, for many decades, that the 
interpretative process is one of ascertaining the intention of the parties — what they 
meant to achieve. And in doing that, the court must consider all the circumstances 
surrounding the contract to determine what their intention was in concluding it. 
KPMG, in the passage cited, explains that parol evidence is inadmissible to modify, vary 
or add to the written terms of the agreement, and that it is the role of the court, and 
not witnesses, to interpret a document. It adds, importantly, that there is no real 
distinction between background circumstances and surrounding circumstances, and 
that a court should always consider the factual matrix in which the contract is 
concluded — the context — to determine the parties' intention. 
The passage cited from the judgment of Wallis JA in Endumeni summarises the state 
of the law as it was in 2012. This court did not change the law, and it certainly did not 
introduce an objective approach in the sense argued by Novartis, which was to have 
regard only to the words on the paper.… A court must examine all the facts — the 
context — in order to determine what the parties intended. And it must do that 
whether or not the words of the contract are ambiguous or lack clarity. Words without 
context mean nothing.”135 (emphasis added) 
 
132 Firstrand supra note 123 para 27. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Novartis supra note 123. 
135 Ibid para 27 and 28. 
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As indicated in the extract, Lewis JA considers the goal of interpretation to be that of 
ascertaining the intention of the parties. Wallis JA in turn considers this a misnomer insofar 
as it suggests an enquiry into the mind of the contracting parties, and rather considers the 
enquiry restricted to ascertaining the meaning of the text itself.136  
Notwithstanding these differences, Lewis JA’s judgment confirms both the continued 
application of the parol evidence rule (as explained in KPMG) and affirms the Endumeni 
approach as a summation of the South African approach to interpretation as at 2012. The 
judgment also confirms that the ‘objective’ approach referred to in Endumeni does not 
contemplate peering at the text in isolation. As previously indicated, the interpretative 
process is a unitary one in which the wording of the text is read in context, having regard to 
the purpose of the provision and the background to the preparation and production of the 
document. 
These similarities in approach were also confirmed by Navsa ADP and Mothle AJA in the case 
of The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Blair Atholl Homeowners Association.137 
The judges state that no practical purpose would be served by selecting one of the approaches 
(i.e. subjective or objective) above the other.138 They affirm the Endumeni approach by stating 
that our courts have moved away from a narrow peering at the words and that a restrictive 
interpretation of the words without context should be avoided.139 Furthermore, the 
distinction between background and surrounding circumstances have fallen away (thus 
endorsing the KPMG approach on parol evidence) and the purpose of the provision should 
also be taken into account.140 All of these factors should be taken into account as part of a 
unitary approach with a sensible (or businesslike) result being sought. In the author’s view, 
the approach endorsed in Blair Atholl is therefore essentially the Endumeni approach. 
However, unlike the Endumeni judgment, the court elaborates on the admissibility of 
evidence and confirms the foundational principles as set out in KPMG.141 This comes in view 
of the fact that following the Endumeni judgment, South African courts have seen an increase 
 
136 Endumeni supra note 120 para 20. 
137 Blair Atholl supra note 16 para 61. 
138 Ibid para 60 
139 Ibid para 61. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid para 64. 
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in cases where the written text was being relegated and extensive inadmissible evidence was 
being led. The author proceeds to consider the principles of evidence admissibility under 
South African law in further detail below.  
3.2 Admissibility of extrinsic evidence 
  
It is goes without saying that it would be  very unproductive for a trial to be conducted without 
any constraints on the admissibility of evidence, and then to expect the judge to sift the wheat 
from the chaff during argument or ultimately at the stage of judgment.142 It impacts 
negatively on  a judge’s decision making, the prompt adjudication of cases and costs.143 It is 
accordingly important that evidence be limited to only that which is relevant and admissible, 
while simultaneously not prohibiting information that could be material to the proper 
interpretation of a document.  
The SCA historically distinguished between three different categories of evidence that could 
be admitted at different stages in the interpretative process. This approach was summarised 
in Delmas Milling Co Ltd as follows: 
“Where although there is difficulty, perhaps serious difficulty, in interpretation but it 
can nevertheless be cleared up by linguistic treatment this must be done. The only 
permissible additional evidence in such cases is of an identificatory nature; such 
evidence is really not used for interpretation but only to apply the contract to the facts.  
Such application may, of course, be itself the cause of the difficulty, giving rise to what 
is sometimes called a latent ambiguity. If the difficulty cannot be cleared up with 
sufficient certainty by studying the language, recourse may be had to 'surrounding 
circumstances' i.e. matters that were probably present to the minds of the parties 
when they contracted (but not actual negotiations and similar statements). It is 
commonly said that the Court is entitled to be informed of all such circumstances in all 
cases (cf. H Richter's case supra at page 69; Garlick v Smartt and Another, 1928 AD 82 
at p. 87; Cairns (Pty.) Ltd v Playdon & Co. Ltd., supra at p. 125). But this does not mean 
that if sufficient certainty as to the meaning can be gathered from the language alone 
 
142 Van Aardt v Galway 2012 (2) SA 312 (SCA) para 10. 
143 Ibid.  
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it is nevertheless permissible to reach a different result by drawing inferences from the 
surrounding circumstances. Whether there is sufficient certainty in the language of 
even very badly drafted contracts to make it unnecessary and therefore wrong to draw 
inferences from the surrounding circumstances is a matter of individual judicial opinion 
on each case. Cases of this class, though they are generally spoken of as cases of 
ambiguity, might conveniently be given some such name as 'cases of uncertainty' to 
distinguish them from the third class of case where even the use of surrounding 
circumstances does not provide 'sufficient certainty'.  
These are cases of ambiguity in the narrow sense, where after the surrounding 
circumstances have been considered there is still no substantial balance in favour of 
one meaning rather than another. The usual examples of such true ambiguity come 
from testamentary documents, but examples are conceivable in the case of contract. 
In these cases, which will naturally be much rarer than those of uncertainty, recourse 
may be had to what passed between the parties on the subject of the contract. One 
must use outside evidence as conservatively as possible but one must use it if it is 
necessary to reach what seems to be a sufficient degree of certainty as to the right 
meaning.”144 (emphasis added) 
A more contemporary summary of the principles of evidence admissibility were set out by 
Harms DP in the KPMG judgment as follows: 
“First, the integration (or parol evidence) rule remains part of our law. However, it is 
frequently ignored by practitioners and seldom enforced by trial courts. If a document 
was intended to provide a complete memorial of a jural act, extrinsic evidence may not 
contradict, add to or modify its meaning ....  
Second, interpretation is a matter of law and not of fact and, accordingly, 
interpretation is a matter for the court and not for witnesses ….  
Third, the rules about admissibility of evidence in this regard do not depend on the 
nature of the document, whether statute, contract or patent ….  
 
144 Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 at 455 to 456. 
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Fourth, to the extent that evidence may be admissible to contextualise the document 
(since 'context is everything') to establish its factual matrix or purpose or for purposes 
of identification, 'one must use it as conservatively as possible' … The time has arrived 
for us to accept that there is no merit in trying to distinguish between 'background 
circumstances' and 'surrounding circumstances'. The distinction is artificial and, in 
addition, both terms are vague and confusing. Consequently, everything tends to be 
admitted. The term 'context' or 'factual matrix' ought to suffice...”145 (emphasis added) 
Although KPMG confirms that extrinsic evidence should be admitted conservatively in 
establishing context, it discards with the distinction between background and surrounding 
circumstances and rather uses an all encapsulating concept of context. It also affirms the 
principle from Delmas that a witness or party to the contract should not be allowed to lead 
evidence on what a particular provision means to him or her. 
Wallis JA has also since discarded Delmas’ staggered approach to evidence admissibility in 
favour of a unitary approach as set out in Endumeni.146 This contemplates that from the outset 
the interpreter considers the text in light of all the relevant and admissible context, including 
the circumstances in which the document came into being.147 All relevant admissible evidence 
is therefore considered from the start. However, this should not be considered as a licence to 
admit anything.  Evidence contrary to the parol evidence rule remains inadmissible, for 
example regarding the contracting parties’ intention or prior negotiations.148 The author 
considers this rule in further detail below.    
3.3 The Parol Evidence rule 
  
The SCA has confirmed on a number of occasions that the parol evidence rule remains part of 
South African law and that the same principles of evidence admissibility apply regardless of 
the nature of the document being interpreted.149  
 
145 KPMG supra note 16 para 39. 
146 Bothma-Batho supra note 123 para 12. 
147 Ibid.  
148 See Van Aardt supra note 142 para 9, where both the KPMG and Delmas judgments are cited with approval 
in relation to his statement.   
149 KPMG has been cited with approval in a number of SCA cases including, Blair Atholl supra note 16 para 69; 
Novartis supra note 123 para 27; Endumeni supra note 120 para 18; Van Aardt supra note 142 para 9.    
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The parol evidence rule has been described as consisting of two independent rules, namely 
the integration rule and the interpretation rule.150 Under the first rule it defines the limits of 
a contract, while under the second it determines when and to what extent extrinsic evidence 
may be adduced to explain or inform the meaning of the words contained in a written 
document.151 
In broad terms the integration rule provides that where a jural act is incorporated in a 
complete written memorial, the text will be regarded as the exclusive memorial of the 
transaction and no extrinsic evidence may be led to contradict, add or vary its terms.152 
Although the evidence excluded under the rule would usually be oral in nature, it can also 
include other documentary evidence.153  
 Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa explains the rule as follows: 
“…where parties have decided that their contract should be recorded in writing and 
that such contract shall be the sole, complete record of their agreement, their decision 
will be respected, and the resulting document, or documents, will be accepted as the 
sole evidence of the terms of the contract.”154 
However, where the parties did not intend for a written contract to be the exclusive memorial 
of their agreement, but merely to record a portion thereof with the remainder being left oral 
(a so called partial integration), the integration rule would only prohibit the admission of 
evidence to contradict the written portion and will not preclude evidence of the supplemental 
oral agreement.155 In order to ascertain whether the parties intended for the written 
instrument to constitute a partial integration, the court will be entitled to consider not only 
the document, but also surrounding circumstances and the negotiations between the parties 
 
150 Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 943.   
151 Ibid. 
152 DP van der Merwe et al ‘Evidence’ in The Law of South Africa 3 ed vol 18 (2015) para 167; Johnston supra 
150 at 938D; Mike Ness Agencies CC t/a Promech Boreholes v Lourensford Fruit Company (Pty) Ltd 2019 ZASCA 
159 (unreported case no: 922/2018) para 15. 
153 Van der Merwe op cit note 152 para 167. 
154 GB Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7 ed (2016) at 226. 
155 Johnston supra 150 at 944; see also Van der Merwe op cit note 152 para 167. 
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leading up to the conclusion of the agreement, provided the use of this evidence will be 
limited to this function.156 
As to the interpretation rule, it is accepted that extrinsic evidence may be led in aid of 
interpreting the written memorial in certain exceptional circumstances.157 However, these 
cases do not constitute an exception to the integration rule, given that there is no addition or 
variation to the text of the document.158 The purpose is rather clarification.  
Furthermore, where a contract appears to be incomplete ex facie the document, evidence 
may be led to explain the lack of completeness, to ascertain why the parties left blanks in the 
particular contract and to ascertain what the integration actually comprises.159 The object of 
this evidence is therefore not to contradict, add or modify the text, but merely to explain the 
lack of completeness in the contract and is not contrary to the integration rule.  
Although the parol evidence rule would not preclude evidence regarding a subsequent oral 
agreement that alters, adds or varies the written agreement, such oral agreement would only 
be effective where, having regard to the particular nature of the agreement (for example a 
sale of land), there has been compliance with the legal formalities required to establish a 
binding agreement.160 This is particularly relevant to the amendment of a DTC, given the 
formalities prescribed under section 108 of the ITA.161 
Notwithstanding the benefits provided by the parol evidence rule, it also presents an 
opportunity for abuse and could be used as a mechanism to enforce fraud where a contracting 
party tries to enforce an agreement, knowing that it does not represent the true agreement 
between the parties. As such the rule has often been departed from by courts in favour of 
achieving a fair result. Christie’s Law of Contract describes the interaction of the rule and the 
possible exceptions thereto as follows: 
 
156 Ibid. 
157 Van der Merwe op cit note 152 para 176 where he refers to examples such as (i) evidence adduced to show 
that words were used in a specialised or technical sense; (ii) evidence to identify the persons and objects 
referred to in a document; and (iii) evidence to place the interpreter in the position of the author by reference 
to facts of which the author of the document was aware.  
158 Ibid. 
159 Johnston supra 150 at 943. 
160 Johnston supra 150 at 938G. 
161 See discussion op cit note 71 which deals with a similar principle in relation to DTCs. 
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“Perhaps the best way to look at the rule is to see it as a backstop that comes into 
operation only in the absence of some more dominant rule, giving way to rules 
concerning misrepresentation, fraud, duress, undue influence, illegality or failure to 
comply with the terms of a statute, mistake and rectification….In all such cases, of 
course, the burden is on a party who has signed a written contract to displace the 
maxim caveat subscriptor by proving lack of the necessary animus.”162  
The example of rectification is often referred to in cases as a basis for admission of extrinsic 
evidence contrary to the written text.163 However as indicated in Blair Atholl, this admission 
would only be possible where a claim for rectification has been pleaded.164 Under a claim for 
rectification, the claimants allege that the actual words of the agreement under consideration 
fails to reflect their common intention and that such wording should therefore be amended 
to reflect the actual intention.165 Given that the onus falls on the claimant to prove the true 
intention of the parties, it would be essential to allow extrinsic evidence in these 
circumstances to prove the actual intention of the parties and explain the reasons for the 
error.  
As far as application is concerned, the parol evidence rule has been applied by our courts to 
not only written contracts, but also judgments and other negotiable instruments.166 This 
broad application was also confirmed in KPMG, where it was stated the rules regarding 
admissibility of evidence do not depend on the nature of the document.167 As such, it is 
considered that the rule would apply to any jural act couched in documentary form.168 This 
has also been confirmed by the SCA in two recent judgments, where it was stated that as part 
of the interpretative process, the rules regulating the admissibility of evidence do not change 
depending on the nature of the document.169 In the author’s view, the judgment of ABC 
 
162 GB Bradfield op cit note 154 at 228. 
163 Blair Atholl supra note 16 para 70; Van Aardt supra note 142 para 9. 
164 Ibid, see also Van der Merwe op cit note 152 para 168. 
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167 KPMG supra note 16 para 39. 
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169 United Manganese supra note 123 para 16; Telkom supra note 123 para 14. 
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Proprietary Ltd is therefore correct in stating that the parol evidence rule would equally apply 
to DTCs. 
3.4 Context under the Endumeni approach 
 
By its very nature context is something that would depend on the particular document under 
consideration and it would therefore be very difficult to create an acceptable all-
encompassing definition of what could be regarded as context when interpreting a document.  
As previously mentioned, KPMG held that extrinsic evidence may be admissible to 
contextualise a document to establish its factual matrix or purpose or for purposes of 
identification, but that 'one must use this evidence as conservatively as possible'. The court 
also discarded the traditional distinction between 'background circumstances' and 
'surrounding circumstances' as artificial and vague and rather preferred to use the term 
'context' or 'factual matrix'.170  
In Blair Atholl, the court considered this statement to mean that extrinsic evidence led to 
contextualise a document was limited to that function and must not extend beyond 
established parameters. For example, a party is not entitled testify about how they 
understood the words used in an agreement, their negotiations leading up to the agreement 
or what their intention had been.171  
In recent times the question of context under the Endumeni approach was expressly 
considered by the SCA in two concurrent tax cases.172 Both cases respond in part to what was 
said in the minority judgment of Majiedt JA and Davis AJA in SARS v Daikin Air Conditioning 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd.173 In this minority judgement it was stated that: 
“Contrary to Endumeni, above at 603 (fn14) which, on the authority of KPMG 
Accountants (SA) v Securifin Ltd 2009 (4) SA399 (SCA), suggests that there is no 
distinction in the interpretation of contracts, statutes and other documents, we can 
find nothing in the judgment of Harms DP in KPMG that prevents a drawing of the 
 
170 KPMG supra note 16 para 39. 
171 Blair Atholl supra note 16 para 66; Van Aardt supra note 142 para 9; Mike Ness supra note 152 para 16. 
172 United Manganese supra note 123; Telkom supra note 123. 
173 SARS v Daikin Air Conditioning South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2018 ZASCA 66 (unreported case no: 185/2017). 
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distinction that we have drawn between the interpretation of legislation and contracts 
or similar documents…It is difficult to see how ‘commercial sensibility’, alluded to by 
Van der Merwe JA, can play any role in interpreting a statute. And a statute must apply 
to all equally – its interpretation cannot be dependent on a particular contextual 
setting, nor can it vary from one factual matrix to the next. Context is fact-specific and 
can be applied in the interpretation of contracts and like documents, but not of 
statutes.”174 (footnotes omitted)  
The judgment therefore firstly contends that the interpretive technique to be employed in 
the interpretation of contracts, statutes and other documents is not a unitary one, and that 
different methods would apply depending on the nature of the document being interpreted. 
Secondly the judgment provides that context should not play a role in the interpretation of 
statutes.   
Wallis JA received an opportunity to deal with these contentions in the subsequent case of 
CSARS v United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd.175 In response to the first issue, he states 
that the minority has misconstrued what was said in Endumeni. He clarifies that the reference 
in Endumeni to KPMG, was to the proposition that the rules of admissibility of evidence in the 
interpretation of documents do not change depending on the nature of the document. Wallis 
JA further reasons that if one were to accept that a common evidential rule applies regardless 
of the document, it should follow that the basic approach to interpretation should also not 
vary depending on the nature of the document being interpreted.176 
Regarding the relevance of context in the interpretation of statutes, Wallis JA reaffirms that 
context is fundamental in approaching the interpretation of all written instruments.177 
However, he does acknowledge that context would differ depending on the nature of the 
document.178 By way of example, the context of a carefully formulated contract drafted by a 
team of lawyers would invariably differ from a basic agreement scribbled on a page in a 
 
174 Ibid para 31. 
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notebook. Likewise, the difference in the genesis of legislation compared to that of contracts 
would result in a different context (or factual matrix) for each. 
Wallis JA further states that legislation will undoubtedly have a context that may be highly 
relevant to their interpretation. In this regard he refers to five sources of context in relation 
to statutes: 
a) Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires that all statutes should be interpreted in 
accordance with the spirit, purpose and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
b) Context provided by the enactment in its entirety. 
c) Where legislation flows from a commission of enquiry or the establishment of a 
specialised drafting committee, reference to their reports is permissible and may 
provide helpful context. 
d) Legislative history can provide useful background as part of the interpretative process. 
e) The general factual background to a statute, including the nature of its concerns, the 
social purpose to which it is directed and in the case of statutes dealing with a 
particular area of public life or the economy, the nature of that area.179  
The judge therefore rejects the minority view and concludes that context is as important in 
construing statutes as it is in relation to the interpretation of any other documents.180  
The minority judgment from Daikin was also considered by the SCA in Telkom SA SOC Limited 
v CSARS.181 The court (Swain JA) regards the interpretive technique contemplated under 
Endumeni as being a unitary exercise (regardless of the nature of the document to be 
interpreted), but not uniform in nature.182  
As a unitary exercise, it requires the consideration of the text (having regard to the ordinary 
rules of grammar and syntax), the context of the provision, the apparent purpose of the 
provision and the material known to those responsible for its production, regardless of the 
nature of the document. In other words, the interpretative technique remains unchanged.183  
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However, the exercise of this unitary technique is not uniform, because depending on the 
nature of the document being interpreted, context would differ and the background 




One last aspect to consider in this chapter is the issue of implied or tacit terms and the 
interpretative technique of ‘reading in’. Although technically not part of the interpretative 
technique contemplated under Endumeni, this is nevertheless an issue that is often raised by 
parties in disputes about the proper interpretation of treaties and informs the process of 
treaty interpretation.185  By way of example, in the recent case of ABC Proprietary Ltd, SARS 
argued for tacit terms to be read into the DTC under consideration on the basis that this would 
give effect to the true intention of the contracting parties.186  
In short, the terms of a contract can either be express or implied.187 Implied terms are those 
terms binding on the parties without any explicit agreement having been concluded in 
writing, and can be further subdivided into ex lege terms (i.e. those implied by law) and tacit 
terms (i.e. those implied from the facts).188 
A tacit term derives from the common intention of the parties as inferred from the express 
terms of the contract, circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the treaty and the 
subsequent practice of the parties.189 It could be either actual (i.e. where the parties thought 
about it, but didn’t bother to express it) or imputed (i.e. parties would have agreed on the 
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issue had they thought about it, but did not do so because they overlooked it or failed to 
anticipate the eventuality in which the term would be required).190 
However, a court will be reluctant to impute a tacit term into an agreement merely because 
it would be reasonable (or sensible in the circumstances). Our courts have historically applied 
the so-called ‘bystander’ test in order to ascertain whether a tacit term should be read into 
the agreement. This test asks the question: “What would the parties have answered if at the 
time of conclusion of the agreement, a bystander had asked them ‘What would happen in 
such a case?’”. If both parties would have replied in agreement that so-and-so would have 
been the case, but they just didn’t trouble to say it because it was so clear, then that 
consequence is deemed to have been intended and a term to that effect can be read into the 
agreement.191 
Where the suggested term is required to give business efficacy to a contract (or where the 
object of the contract would be frustrated in the absence of the term being implied), it may 
more readily be accepted that the parties had the term in mind or would have assented to it 
under the bystander test.192 However, where the imputed term is not necessary to render the 
agreement (or treaty) fully functional, and it would merely have been reasonable or sensible 
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or convenient for the parties to have adopted it, it would not necessarily follow that the 
parties had it in mind or would have agreed to it.193  
Importantly, a tacit term cannot be implied directly in conflict with an express term of the 
agreement, provided that in the case of ambiguity the express terms may leave room for a 
tacit term to be applied.194  
3.6 Conclusion  
 
Following the analysis above, the author concludes that the approach to interpretation as 
originally described in Endumeni has become settled law and is regarded as an accurate 
reflection of the contemporary South African interpretive approach.  
It contemplates an objectively purposive approach to interpretation in which the text must 
be interpreted, properly contextualised (taking account of the document as a whole, material 
known to the persons responsible for its production, circumstance attendant upon its 
creation and such other sources of context as might be applicable to the particular document 
under consideration) and having regard to the apparent purpose of the document. The 
interpretive process is a unitary one in which all the elements need to be considered from the 
outset without hierarchy.  
As with any interpretation a sensible (or businesslike) interpretation should be preferred to 
one that is not, provided that this should not be used as justification by an interpreter for 
interposing a meaning which contradicts the actual words of the text.  
Importantly, our courts (both in Endumeni itself and thereafter) have reiterated that 
Endumeni has not introduced unlimited leeway to lead evidence and parties remain subject 
to the ordinary principles of evidence admissibility and the parol evidence rule. Save for 
certain exceptions to the parol evidence rule, parties will not be allowed to lead evidence of 
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their prior negotiations and stated intentions at the time of concluding the agreement and 
evidence should be limited to the function of contextualising the agreement.  
A summary of the key principles identified in this chapter has been included in Appendix C 
below. In the next chapter the author will compare the interpretive approaches identified in 
chapter 2 and 3 with the view of identifying commonalities and/or differences between the 




CHAPTER 4 – COMPARISON OF THE APPROACHES  
 
Following on the analysis in chapter two and three, the author now proceeds to compare the 
two approaches. This comparison looks at the general interpretive method applied, as well as 
the constituent elements of the two approaches. 
4.1 General interpretive approach 
 
Both approaches contemplate a unitary purposive approach to interpretation in which the 
starting point is the text of the document, properly contextualised and having regard to the 
purpose of the treaty. All these elements must be considered from the outset without 
hierarchy.  
Both approaches also advocate for an objective approach to interpretation in which the text 
remains the authentic expression of the parties’ intention and the focus of interpretation is 
the elucidation of the text’s meaning and not an investigation ab initio into the subjective 
intention  of the parties.  
4.2 Good faith 
  
The VCLT approach requires that a treaty be interpreted in good faith.  This requires that 
where two possible interpretations are possible, the one that enables the treaty to have its 
appropriate effect should be preferred as determined with reference to good faith (and the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda) and the purpose of the treaty. The Endumeni approach in 
turn requires a sensible or businesslike interpretation to be adopted over an interpretation 
that undermines the purpose of the document.  
The author considers that both essentially require the same thing, i.e. a sensible 
interpretation that doesn’t undermine the purpose of the DTC. Furthermore, both reiterate 
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that this should not be used as a basis for substituting the actual text with the interpreter’s 
subjective views.  
4.3 Context 
 
In terms of both approaches context needs to be taken into account from the outset as part 
of the unitary process regardless of whether the text is ambiguous or not. Under the South 
African approach context is understandably not defined and our courts have to consider the 
nature of the particular document being interpreted to determine what constitutes context. 
The VCLT in turn deals with a particular set of documents (i.e. international treaties) and is 
therefore able (in part) to define what should be considered as part of the context of a treaty. 
Under the Endumeni approach evidence informing context is subject to the ordinary 
principles of evidence admissibility, which includes the parol evidence rule. As such evidence 
informing context would generally be admissible, provided it does not constitute evidence of 
the parties’ prior negotiations or their intention at the time of concluding the agreement. The 
VCLT does not contain any limitations on the admissibility of this type of evidence, provided 
it qualifies as either context or supplementary means of interpretation. 
4.4 Object and Purpose 
  
 As with context, both methods provide that the object and purpose of a treaty must be 
considered from the outset as part of the unitary interpretive process. The purpose of a treaty 
would need to inform the process regardless of whether there is ambiguity in the text. Both 
approaches indicate that the purpose of the treaty would not be considered as an 
independent means of interpretation that could justify a meaning contrary to the treaty text, 
but rather serves to elucidate the text and facilitate a sensible meaning that gives effect to 
this purpose. 
4.5 Subsequent agreements and practice 
 
 In terms of the VCLT, subsequent agreements, practice and rules of international law would 
need to be considered together with the context as part of the unitary process. Although the 
domestic approach does not expressly deal with these items, it is considered that they can 
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possibly be introduced into the unitary process as context, especially when one considers that 
context would be informed by the nature of the document being interpreted. As such it would 
remain subject to the ordinary domestic principles regulating the admissibility of evidence. 
Insofar as a subsequent agreement or practice alters the treaty this would only be effective 
insofar as there has been compliance with the formalities prescribed under domestic law. 
4.6 Supplementary means of interpretation 
  
Apart from stating that it expressly includes the preparatory work to the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, ‘supplementary means’ is not defined in the VCLT. As such 
there has often been debate about what evidence will fall under this category. Under the 
Endumeni approach, no reference is made to the concept of supplementary means, but it 
provides that consideration must be given to the to the material known to those responsible 
for the treaty’s production and the background to the preparation.  
In terms of the VCLT, supplementary means of interpretation can always be used to confirm 
the ordinary meaning determined under the general rule. However, it can only serve as an 
independent means of interpretation to determine the meaning of a treaty where the 
ordinary meaning is ambiguous, obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable. Accordingly, although the VCLT imposes certain limitations on the use of 
supplementary material, there are no restrictions placed on the admissibility of such 
information and it can be introduced up front as part of the unitary process. 
Under the Endumeni approach, one must consider the material known to those responsible 
for the treaty’s production and the background to the preparation as part of the unitary 
process, regardless of whether the ordinary meaning is ambiguous or not. This evidence can 
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therefore also be introduced upfront as part of the unitary process and admissibility will be 
subject to the ordinary principles of evidence admissibility. 
4.7 Evidence admissibility 
 
As previously indicated the VCLT does not expressly impose any limitations on the 
admissibility of evidence, provided it can be included under one of the categories listed under 
article 31 and 32.  
The South African domestic approach remains subject to the ordinary domestic principles of 
evidence admissibility, including the parol evidence rule. Our courts have confirmed that the 
principles of evidence admissibility apply regardless of the nature of the document to be 
interpreted and would therefore equally apply to the interpretation of a DTC as it would to a 
domestic contract. 
In applying the parol evidence rule, our courts would therefore not allow extrinsic evidence 
to be led that contradicts, adds or modifies the text of a DTC, irrespective of whether such 
evidence informs context or is regarded as supplementary means under the VCLT. Evidence 
regarding the contracting parties’ intention or prior negotiations would generally be 
prohibited under the parol evidence rule. However, unilateral statements of intent would in 
any event also be inadmissible under the VCLT as it would not fall under any of the categories 
mentioned in article 31 and 32.  
However, a court would need to consider whether any of the exceptions to the rule possibly 
apply. Examples would include where the contracting parties plead rectification of the treaty 
text, where they allege the existence of a special/technical meaning, or in support of proving 
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partial integration. In these cases, the parties would be able to lead evidence as to their 
intention to prove the abovementioned.   
Finally, the parol evidence rule would not prevent extrinsic evidence from being led that 
merely clarifies or elucidates the text of the treaty  
4.8 Special Meaning 
 
Both approaches acknowledge that in some instances a special or technical meaning (other 
than that suggested by the ordinary grammatical meaning of the text) might have been 
intended by the parties. In such a case, the onus would be on the party alleging the special 
meaning. Accordingly, evidence as to the parties’ intention and prior negotiations could be 
admissible in this context. Evidence in support of a special meaning would not be contrary to 
the parol evidence rule, provided it does not add or vary the actual text.  
4.9 Conclusion 
 
Although the comparison above indicates that the two approaches align with each other to a 
large extent, there are certain areas in which the domestic approach differs somewhat from 
the VCLT. These differences are listed below: 
i) Categories of interpretive aids: The VCLT categorises interpretive aids into defined 
subcategories under article 31 and 32 (i.e. “context” as defined, “subsequent 
agreements, practice and rules of international law” and “supplementary means”). 
In contrast the South African approach does not categorise interpretive aids into 
categories, but rather works with the overarching concept of context (or the 
factual matrix).  
 
ii) Context as defined: The VCLT expressly defines context. Under the South African 
domestic approach, context will depend on the nature of the document being 
interpreted. Accordingly, the determination of context under the domestic 




iii) Use of supplementary means: The VCLT places a limitation on the use of 
supplementary means. The South African domestic approach does not distinguish 
supplementary means from other context, and accordingly this information 
(provided it is admissible) will inform the interpretive process from the outset. 
 
iv) Admissibility of evidence: The VCLT does not expressly deal with evidence 
admissibility. Limitations could potentially be inferred with reference to the 
categories of interpretive aids that are considered relevant under article 31 and 
32, but as indicated before, this does present the possibility of admitting 
supplementary means (and as such extrinsic material) in all instances, subject only 
to the limitations on use. The South African approach on the other hand remains 
subject to the domestic principles regulating the admissibility of evidence. As 
indicated above, these principles are applied by our domestic courts in the 
interpretation of all documents, including treaties.     
In the final chapter the author summarises the findings of the foregoing chapters and 





CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION  
 
Following the recent judgment of ABC Proprietary Ltd, the author sought to obtain greater 
clarity on the appropriate domestic approach to the interpretation of treaties and in particular 
the admissibility of evidence, while taking account of the fact that the interpretation of a DTC 
remains subject to the rules on interpretation prescribed under the VCLT.  
In chapter two the author analysed article 31 and 32 of the VCLT as informed by international 
case law and commentary. Through this process the author was able to identify the approach 
to the interpretation of treaties as recommended by the VCLT and ascertain the limitations 
(if any)  imposed on the admissibility of evidence and the use of extrinsic means of 
interpretation under customary international law. 
In chapter three the author considered the contemporary South African approach to 
interpretation and the admissibility of evidence. The author also considered under what 
circumstances a court would read words into the text of a document as part of the 
interpretative process. Upon conclusion of this chapter, the author was able to identify the 
recommended domestic approach to the interpretation of documents and the rules 
regulating the admissibility of evidence. 
In chapter four the author compared the two approaches and identified commonalities and 
differences between the two approaches. The comparison was structured with reference to 
the underlying elements that inform the two approaches, i.e. the general interpretive 
technique applied, the role of good faith, the object and purpose of the document, 
subsequent agreements and practice and finally supplementary means of interpretation and 
the application of the parol evidence rule. 
5.1 Approach going forward 
 
As indicated at the beginning of this dissertation, the author did not include an analysis of 
South African cases on the interpretation of DTCs. 195 The reason for this is that many of the 
recent South African treaty cases (including ABC Propriety Ltd) merely took the view that 
 
195 For a summary of South African cases on treaty interpretation see Du Plessis op cit note 33.  
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treaty interpretation is no different from our ordinary domestic principles as set out in 
Endumeni. As a result, our domestic courts generally do not deal with the VCLT rules in any 
particular detail as part of their judgments, but rather tend to revert to the ordinary domestic 
principles of interpretation and evidence admissibility. 
In one of the very few SCA judgments on treaty interpretation the full bench (which included 
Wallis JA) held that: 
“Regarding the approach to be adopted in construing the relevant provisions, 
consideration must be had to the rules applicable to the interpretation of treaties 
which are binding on South Africa and all states as rules of customary international 
law. These rules, which are essentially no different from those generally applied by our 
courts in construing statutes and agreements, are set out in arts 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties…”196   
The author agrees with Hattingh that this statement reflects the SCA’s desire to synthesise 
the approach to legal interpretation in South Africa and work towards a less disparate process 
of legal interpretation that is not dictated by the type of legal document under 
consideration.197    
This movement towards a synthesised approach has been confirmed in subsequent 
judgments of the SCA, the most recent of which include Telkom and United Manganese 
mentioned in chapter 3. In both cases the SCA full bench confirmed that: 
i) the rules regulating the admissibility of evidence does not change depending on 
the nature of the document; and 
ii) the fundamental interpretive technique or approach to interpretation will not vary 
depending on whether the document under consideration is a contract, a statute 
or some other type of document.198 
In view of the comparison in chapter 4, the author does not consider there to be any reason 
why the Endumeni approach could not be applied equally to the interpretation of DTCs. The 
 
196 Krok supra note 21 para 27. 
197 See Hattingh’s commentary on the Krok judgement op cit note 24 at 46D-E. 
198 Telkom supra note 123 para 14; United Manganese supra note 123 para 16. 
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author considers a synthesised approach to interpretation as suggested by the SCA to be both 
acceptable and preferred in relation to DTCs.  
Similarly, in relation to evidence admissibility, a court should not consider the lack of express 
regulation under the VCLT to constitute a licence to admit evidence more liberally when 
interpreting treaties. The parties remain subject to the ordinary domestic principles of 
evidence admissibility as confirmed in KPMG. 
The author considers that a synthesised approach like this would contribute towards legal 
certainty as judges will be tasked with applying a unitary interpretive technique and will 
adjudicate the admissibility of evidence on the same basis regardless of the document under 
consideration.  
However as indicated by the SCA in Telkom and United Manganese, context will naturally vary 
depending on the nature of the document being interpreted.199 As such, a court should be 
mindful of and be guided by the VCLT on what constitutes context in relation to a treaty. In 
addition, section 233 of the Constitution requires that when interpreting a DTC, an 
interpretation consistent with international law (which includes the VCLT principles) must be 
preferred.  
In conclusion the author therefore considers it appropriate to apply the domestic principles 
of interpretation and evidence admissibility when interpreting a DTC, provided that the 
court’s approach is informed by (and consistent) with the VCLT and other relevant sources of 
international law. The court should also be cognisant of foreign judgments as an interpretive 
aid, particularly where similar treaty wording has been considered.   
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“Article 31, GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION 
 
1.  A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose. 
 
2.  The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
 
(a)  Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
 
(b)  Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as 
an instrument related to the treaty. 
 
3.  There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
 
(a)  Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
 
(b)  Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
 
(c)  Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 
 
4.  A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. 
 
Article 32. SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF INTERPRETATION 
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order 
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 : 
 
(a)  Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
 
(b)  Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”200 
 





Provision Element  Admissibility Use 
31(1) Treaty 
text  
Always The point of departure under the general rule is that 
the text must be interpreted in good faith, in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning properly 
contextualised and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 
 
The general rule contemplates a unitary exercise in 
which all the elements are thrown into a crucible to 
deliver the relevant interpretation.  The elements 
are not applied in a hierarchical fashion with one 
element taking preference over another.  
 
The text must be presumed to be the authentic 
expression of the parties’ intention.  The starting 
point of interpretation is therefore an elucidation of 
the text’s meaning and not an investigation ab initio 
into the intention of the contracting parties. 
 
Where a treaty is open to two interpretations one of 
which does and the other which does not enable the 
treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and 
the object and purpose of the treaty will demand 
that the former interpretation should be adopted. 
However, this would not call for an extensive or 
liberal interpretation that goes beyond the 




Provision Element Admissibility Use 
31(1) Object and 
Purpose 
Always The Unitary process requires that the treaty be 
interpreted in light of its object and purpose.  
 
This does not equate to the subjective intention of 
the contracting parties, but rather the goal of the 
entire treaty and not the purpose of a single treaty 
provision. 
 
Object and purpose is subordinated to the actual 
text and does not function as an independent 
means of interpretation, but merely to elucidate 




Provision Element Admissibility Use 
31(2) Context Always Primary interpretative material to be considered as 
part of the unitary process (regardless of whether 
the treaty text is ambiguous or not), 
 
Context is expressly defined in the VCLT and includes 
in addition to the text, the preamble, and the 
annexes, the following:  
 
a) agreements between parties in connection 
with conclusion of treaty; and  
 
b) instruments made by a contracting party in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty 
and accepted by all other parties.  
 
These documents are not subject to the same 
limitations on use as those prescribed under article 
32 and can always be used to inform context. 
 
Unilateral documents (e.g. technical explanations 
and statements from people involved in 
negotiations) will only be included to the extent that 










Always The following documents to be considered from 
the outset together with the context as part of 
the unitary process: 
 
a) subsequent agreement between the 
parties regarding interpretation of 
treaty/application of treaty provisions; 
 
b) subsequent practice in application of the 
treaty which establishes agreement 
regarding interpretation; and 
 
c) rules of international law applicable to 
relationship between parties. 
 
Distinguished from paragraph 2 on the basis that 
this is not intrinsic contemporaneous 
documents, but subsequent 
agreements/practice extrinsic to the original 
agreement.  
 
No hierarchy applies under article 31 and these 
items carry equal weight to the items listed in 
paragraph 2.  
 
To the extent that any subsequent 
agreement/practice alters treaty text, this will 
only be effective insofar as compliant with 





Provision Element Admissibility Use 
31(4) Special 
meaning 
Always – Subject to 
onus on party alleging 
existence of special 
meaning. 
Notwithstanding the apparent ordinary 
meaning determined under the general 
rule, where the parties intended for a 
special/technical meaning to apply this will 
trump ordinary meaning.  
 
Burden of proof would be on the party 












Despite imposing limitations on use, 
article 32 does not limit the 
admissibility of supplementary means 
in any way. This information can 
therefore be introduced from the start 
as part of the unitary process. 
 
The function of supplementary means 
is limited to the confirmation of the 
article 31 meaning.  
 
It only serves as an autonomous means 
of interpretation where article 31 leads 
to an ambiguous or obscure meaning or 
results in a manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable result.  
 
As to what constitutes ‘supplementary 
means’, this is not defined, although 
preparatory work to the treaty (travaux 
préparatoires) and the circumstance of 








Element  Admissibility Use 
Text of the 
document 
Always Point of departure is the language of the provision (taking 
account of ordinary rules of grammar and syntax) read in light 
of the document as a whole, having regard to the context 
and purpose of the document, the material known to those 
responsible for its production and the circumstance 
attendant upon its coming into existence.  
 
The process contemplated above is a unitary and objective 
one in which all the elements are considered from the outset. 
However, it is not uniform, and context will vary depending 
on the nature of the document being interpreted. 
 
A sensible or businesslike interpretation is to be preferred to 
one that undermines the purpose of the document. 
Notwithstanding this, the primacy of the text remains, and 
interpreters should not use this as a basis for substituting the 





Element  Admissibility Use 
Context Always, subject to 
domestic parol 
evidence rule. 
Regardless of whether the text is ambiguous or not, context 
must be considered from the outset as part of the unitary 
process contemplated above. 
 
What constitutes context would depend on the nature of 
the document and is not defined. Our courts have stated 
that possible sources of context in relation to a statute 
could include: 
 
o The Bill of Rights 
o The enactment considered as whole (arguably this 
would already be considered as part of the unitary 
process described above) 
o Reports prepared by specialised drafting committees, 
commissions of enquiry and the like. 
o Legislative history  
o General background to the statute (e.g. regarding 
preparation and production of the particular 
document), the concerns it was intended to address, the 
social purpose it is directed towards etc. 
 
The admissibility of evidence informing context will be 
subject to the parol evidence rule. Parties will therefore not 
be able to lead evidence of their prior negotiations and 
what their intentions were at the time of concluding the 
agreement. The evidence should be limited to the function 





Element  Admissibility Use 
Purpose Always, subject 
to domestic parol 
evidence rule. 
The purpose of the provision under consideration 
must be considered from the outset as part of the 
unitary process. As with context this is required 
regardless of whether the ordinary meaning is 
ambiguous.  
 
A sensible (businesslike) meaning that gives effect to 
the purpose of the provision is to be preferred, this 
would be subject to the constraints imposed by the 






to domestic parol 
evidence rule. 
The parol evidence rule would not preclude evidence 
regarding subsequent agreements and practice. 
However, to the extent that such subsequent 
agreement or practice alters the written agreement 
under consideration, this would need to comply with 
such formalities as may be prescribed under 
domestic law.  
 
For example in relation to the conclusion of a DTC (or 
amendments thereto by way of protocol), this would 
need to be done in compliance with section 108(2) of 









Always, subject to 
domestic parol 
evidence rule. 
According to the Endumeni approach 
consideration must be given to the material 
known to those responsible for the production 
of the document being interpreted and the 
background to the preparation.  
 
Consideration of this information is not subject 














Where the document under consideration was intended 
to provide a complete memorial of the agreement, 
extrinsic evidence cannot be led that contradicts, adds or 
modifies the text. Irrespective of whether such evidence 
informs the context (factual matrix), it would be 
inadmissible. 
 
Evidence regarding the contracting parties’ intention or 
prior negotiations would generally be prohibited in 
accordance with the parol evidence rule.  
 
In the event of partial integration (i.e. where the written 
agreement is not intended as a complete memorial of the 
agreement), the rule will only prohibit extrinsic evidence 
on the written portion and evidence can still be led in 
relation to the existence of a supplemental  oral 
agreement.  
 
This rule would further be subject to a number of 
exceptions, for example where the parties claim 
rectification or to prove partial integration. Evidence may 
also be led in clarification of the agreement, provided it 
does not add or vary the text. 
 
Rules regarding evidence admissibility apply regardless of 






Element Admissibility Use 
Special 
meaning 
Always Onus would be on person alleging the existence of special or 
technical meaning. Accordingly, party should be allowed to 
lead evidence on intention and prior negotiations in this 
limited context. 
 
Such evidence would not contravene the parol evidence rule 
provided it does not add/vary the actual text. 
 
 
 
